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The Determinants of Management Expenses  by Michael Berkowitz & Yehuda Kotowitz
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model which explains the determinants of  the management
expenses charged by U.S. equity funds.  The study shows that for high quality managers, an
increase in quality is associated with higher fees.  In contrast, as the quality of the lower quality
managers deteriorates, their fees increase.  A non-linear negative relationship is found between the
size of a fund and its management expenses.  Economies of scope are also shown to exist between
the number of funds within a mutual fund complex and the management expenses charged
investors.  Finally, while 12b-1 fees have been thought of as a  substitute for load charges, this
paper suggests that they are complements.  -1-
The Determinants of Management Expenses
1.0 Introduction
Each year mutual fund managers receive a management fee typically computed as a
percentage of the fund's average net assets.  The fee usually varies from .50% to 1.50%.  In most
instances, the fees are charged on a sliding scale that declines with the size of the fund.   In
addition to the fees,  in 1980, the SEC introduced the 12b-1 plan that permits funds to deduct as
much as 1.25% of average net assets per year to be used to cover distribution costs such as
advertising, commissions paid to brokers and general marketing expenses.  Other administrative
costs of operating a fund include the costs of compliance with security regulations, auditing and
legal fees. The sum of these management and administrative costs expressed as a percentage of
average net assets is known as the management expense ratio (MER).
For the sample of 1065 U.S. equity funds covered on Morningstar's May 1996 OnDisc, the
mean MER was 1.29%, ranging from a low of 1.16% for Growth-Income funds to 1.61% for
Aggressive Growth funds.  Because the average net asset value of the funds was $812.2 million,
the average gross expense per fund was $10.48 million, or $11.16 billion  for the entire sample of
U.S. equity funds.   This sum is certainly not a trivial amount, yet there has been little discussion in
the literature about the determinants of these expenses.
In number of related studies, Sharpe (1966) concluded that funds that performed well had
lower expense ratios than those that performed poorly.  Friend, Blume and Crockett (1970), on the
other  hand, were not able to substantiate Sharpe's earlier results.  Baumol et al (1990) found scale  A mutual fund complex is an organization offering a range of financial intermediary  and  investment
2
services.  A complex may consist of several mutual funds, private investment counseling services as well as
brokerage activities.  Each mutual fund within a complex is a separate legal entity with a separate contract with the
same advisor for investment management services.
-2-
economies as well as economies of scope in the cost structure of mutual fund complexes which
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they argued must be considered in evaluating mutual fund fees.   Recent studies in the area that are
particularly relevant  to our examination of management expenses include the work of Ferris &
Chance (1987) and Gruber (1996).   Ferris & Chance examined the effect of 12b-1 plans on mutual
fund expense ratios.   The authors tested a model that attempted to explain the cross-sectional
variation in expense ratios across funds using size, objective, load and presence  of a 12b-1 plan. 
The authors concluded that, as expected, the presence of a 12b-1 plan was only a dead-weight cost
and that investors accept this cost because they know very little about it and even less on how to
evaluate its economic impact.
In his 1996 presidential address to the American Finance Association, Professor Elton
Gruber (1996) focussed on the growth in the mutual fund industry.  Because both "good" and
"poorly" managed funds sell at net asset value, Gruber argued that management per se appears not  
to be priced in the market.  The counterargument to this is that management is priced in the long
run, because management raises the fees and expenses it charges customers to reflect "good
management".   Gruber presents evidence, however, showing that high fees are associated with
inferior rather than superior management.  None of the papers we are aware of present an explicit
model of fee setting explaining the observed relations to the variables investigated. 
This paper develops an explicit profit maximization model which explains why an inverse
relationship exists between performance and management expenses for poorly managed funds and
why a direct relationship exists for those funds that perform well.  The basic premise is that high-3-
fees lead to lower measured performance evaluations in the future and, hence, lower future market
shares.  Since future fees are directly linked to future market shares, the manager must trade off the
immediate benefits of a fee hike against the future costs associated with that increase in fees.  This
trade off is shown to critically depend upon the quality of the manager and the expected life of the
fund.   A number of  interesting observations follow from our empirical analysis:
i. Management expenses decrease non-linearly with an increase in fund size;
ii. The better of the poor performing funds have lower MER's than do those funds at
the lowest end of the performance spectrum while improved performance leads to
higher MER's for funds that perform well in the past;
iii. 12b-1 expenditures complement load charges and are most common for back-
loaded funds;  
iv. Companies charge close to the maximum allowed 12b-1 fee;
v. There appear to be some economies of scope with respect to the number of mutual
funds within the same fund complex;
vi. Funds with more conservative objectives have lower MER's than do funds with
more aggressive objectives; and
vii. Fund managers that turn their portfolios over more often have higher MER's than
those following a more passive strategy.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the model and comparative static
results. Section 3 discusses the variables while Section 4 describes the data used in the study. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results and  Section 6 is by way of summary and conclusions. t fNt C0 C(N,q,z)




MER's  are prices (or fees) which investors pay to funds for management services. We
assume that the determination of management fees is no different than that of other prices.  All
other things equal, an increase in management fees produces a direct increase in the present value
of the cash flows to the manager.  At the same time, the increase in fees reduces returns.  In
response, investors shift their capital to higher net return funds, reducing future fund revenue. 
Assuming that managers choose fees optimally, the marginal benefits and costs associated with a
change in fee are equated for each fund.  
To formalize the argument, define net fund profit per unit time ( ): t
where f is the management expense ratio; Nrepresents total net asset value at the end of the t 
period; C is the variable cost of fund management, an increasing function of the size of the fund
with average and marginal costs decreasing in the quality of the management (q).  z is a vector of
variables likely to affect operating and marketing conditions, such as the existence and nature of
load charges, allowable 12b-1 expenditures, fund objectives, asset turnover and the size of the
fund family.   The  expenses include advertising expenses, accounting and legal fees as well as the
costs of communicating with unitholders.  Trading costs are excluded since they are deducted
from fund income prior to the determination of the net asset value.  We assume that there are
fixed costs of operations (C) and that the variable costs are increasing in size and decreasing in 0
management.dMt
dt
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  Berkowitz & Kotowitz (1992, 1997) show that in both the Canadian and the US markets, expectations
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of future performance are based upon past performance.
  See Jensen (1968). We have chosen alpha as a measure of performance in the interest of simplicity and
4
comparability with other studies, e.g.  Berkowitz & Kotowitz (1997), Gruber ( 1996), Ferris & Chance (1987),





Investors are assumed to allocate their capital among funds on the basis of expected
performance (net of fees), which is determined by the quality of management.  As quality is
unknown, investors are assumed to base their expectations on past performance. 
In order to simplify the exposition we assume that investors adjust their holdings in
response to changes in past performance so that market shares (M) change according to the t
following simple process:
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where  ( ) is that part of the change in market share due to the past performance of the fund. 
Performance is measured by Jensen' s alpha.     is the period to period persistence in market
4
share. For any period t, the market share can be expressed as:
Alternatively, in terms of the fund’s net asset value, we have(1 )M0[1 e T] T
0
[ ( ) (f CN) ][e t e t]dt 0
f
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  The assumption here is that f is constant.  This is because a significant part of the MER is composed of
5
advisory fees which cannot be easily and frequently changed.  A comparison of MER's  in 1994 and 1996 for the
546 funds used in our study, and available in each of the two years, shows a mean difference in MER's of .0096%




where g is the growth rate for the industry.
Fund managers set fees (and other variables) to maximize the present value of lifetime
profits. The life of any fund, T, is a function of both its initial market share, M, and the 0
performance of the fund.  The objective is then to choose f so as to maximize the present value of
the net benefits to the fund as specified in (1) subject to the net asset value specification in (4). 
5
The solution to this problem is an equation implicit in the optimal fee:
where   = r + (1- ) - g,   = r - g > 0 and r is the rate of discount.  Assume for simplicity a linear
relationship between past performance and changes in market share, i.e.   ( ) = a + b  where    
 =q-f . We can then solve explicitly for the optimal fee.
where     > 0.
From (3), in the steady state, the market share each period is simply equal to                  
[a+b(q-f)]/(1- ).  The existence of fixed costs defines a minimum market share ( ) sustainable¯ M M0e (1 )T a b(q f)
(1 )




























over a long period. Let T be the period in which the firm ceases to exist once it falls below the
critical market share.  Specifically, T is defined by the following:
If [a+b(q-f)]/(1- ) >  , then irrespective of the initial market share, the firm will continually
grow with an infinite expected life.  From (6), the optimal fee is then simply:
where A' = (1/ ) - (1/ ).
Declining funds, for which the steady state is short of the minimum sustainable market
share, will terminate operations once the minimum share of the market is attained.  Their optimal
fees are  represented directly by the expression in (6).
We can now examine how the optimal fee changes with respect to the quality of the fund
manager and size of the fund.  Looking first to high quality and, hence, growing funds with an
infinite expected life, from (8), a change in quality has the following effect on optimal fees:   
Although the second term in (9) is negative, we expect that   f*/ q > 0 because the main effects
of better management are likely to be reflected in improved (gross) performance, rather than in
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0 (10)
  Proof available from authors.
6
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improved performance in the form of higher fees. 
For those funds with a finite life, from (6), 
Assuming C  and C  are constant, comparing equation (10) to (9), we see that (10) contains an Nq NN
additional term which is enclosed within the large brackets, times  T/ q.  This term  represents the
effect of quality on the optimal fee through its effect on expected fund life.  Since T/ q is
positive, as shown in the Appendix, comparison of (9) and (10) depends upon the sign of the
expression within the large brackets.  It can be shown that  the first term is negative and becomes
stronger as T becomes shorter which is our expectation for low quality funds.   As long as the
6
marginal cost term, which is ambiguous in sign, is dominated by the first term, the expression
within large brackets is negative and suggests that for low quality funds, an increase in quality has
less effect on fees than a similar increase for high quality funds.  It may be, moreover, that the
effect of a decrease in quality for low quality funds is to actually induce an increase in fees, in
contrast to the positive relationship expected for high quality funds.  
The intuition for this is as follows.  Since lower ability managers expect to hit the critical
size level in a relatively short time period, their time horizon is quite short.  All other things equal,
the lower the ability of the manager, the shorter is the time frame for the fund.  For such managers,
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suggests a negative non-linear relation between quality and fees with the negative effect strongest
for the lowest quality managers.
The effect of initial fund size on optimal fees can be analyzed by looking at the derivative
of f* with respect to N .  For high quality managers, we have   0 
Since C  < 0 and as  N is large,  f / N  < 0 for the high quality funds.   For  poor quality NN 0   0
*
funds, assuming C is constant, an additional term is added to (11). NN 
 The attached Appendix shows that for a poor quality fund, T/ N  >0.  As argued earlier, we 0
expect the term in brackets to be negative so that we anticipate that for poor quality funds, the
negative relationship between size and fees is stronger than it is for high quality  funds. 
3.0   Estimation of the Model
The estimating equations in (6) and (7) are not sufficiently specific to yield an exact
functional form.  However, our comparative statics suggest some distinct non-linearities and
differences between growing (high quality) and declining (low quality) funds. We therefore




separately for 'high quality' and 'low quality' funds with different functional forms for the key
variables. 
In estimating the model, we must use proxy variables for fund quality since actual quality
is not observable.  In common with investors, we use measures of  ex post performance as proxies
for quality.  While the correct measurement of  ex post performance is under considerable debate,
we have chosen to use gross (q) or net ( ) risk-adjusted returns based on the fund's beta. Previous
research (Berkowitz & Kotowitz, 1997) suggests that investors respond to differences in alpha in
their fund allocations. The use of alpha is also consistent with other studies and media
descriptions of fund performance.
7
Either measure of quality involves a measurement error. Gross risk-adjusted returns
include expenses necessary to obtain the return which should be excluded, while net risk-adjusted
returns omit discretionary fees, which should be included.  To the best of our knowledge,
information on the composition of fees into their discretionary and non-discretionary components
is not available.  Moreover, both proxy measures are subject to an error in the measurement of
risk.  Therefore, we report the results based upon both proxies for fund quality. 
The comparative static results suggest that quality is likely to affect fees differently for
'high quality' funds whose steady state market share is above the minimum share and 'low quality'
funds whose market share is below the critical level.  Funds with non-negative alphas are assumed
to belong to the 'high quality' group while those with negative alphas are assumed to belong to the
'low quality' group.  From our earlier discussion, we expect that for high quality funds, a positive  According to an article in Mutual Fund Magazine, April 1997, "Mercy Killings", this practice  has
8
become quite common.  
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relation exists between quality and fees.  We do not have any a priori indications of significant
non-linearities between quality and fees for this group. In contrast, for low quality firms, we
expect a significant negative effect  on fees due to the increase in expected fund life attributable to
increased quality.  It is clear that this effect is non-linear and declining in T.  Consequently, we
expect the negative effect to increase as quality falls.
An interesting implication of this relationship for low quality managers is that the lower
the quality and, therefore, lower the expected time horizon of the fund manager, the greater is the
incentive to take on additional risk.  Failing to achieve success, the management company can
merge the poor performer within another fund within its family and bury the historical
performance of the poor performer forever. The SEC requires citing only the surviving fund's
track record.     
8
From our earlier discussion, the comparative statics suggests a negative relationship
between size and fees with this effect being stronger for low quality funds than it is for high
quality funds.  As the main determinants of the relation between size and fees are economies of
scale, it is reasonable to expect them to diminish in size.  This is supported by Ferris & Chance
(1987) who find a negative logarithmic relation between size and fees.
In addition to fund quality and size, we also consider a set of other variables.  For
example, the number of funds within the management company complex may affect the fees
charged.  As the size of the fund family increases, many of the administration and research costs
can be spread over more funds which decreases the average cost per fund within the group.  As-12-
the number of funds increases, we expect the average cost to become flatter with little, if any, 
economies of scope associated with larger groups.
Berkowitz & Kotowitz (1997) have suggested that there exists a segmentation of the
mutual fund market between naive and sophisticated investors into load and no-load funds,
respectively.  In contrast, Ferris & Chance (1987) argue that no-load funds must rely more heavily
on advertising and other 12b-1 expenses than do load funds, which can rely upon agent's
commissions (excluded from expenses), thus leading to higher expenses for load funds. In order
to examine these relationships we include load dummy variables together with 12b-1 fees as
possible explanators of expense ratios.
We also examined the effect of the age of the fund upon its management fees.  Ferris and
Chance suggest that there might be a learning-curve effect which might enable an older fund to
operate more efficiently and, therefore, charge lower fees. 
In order to capture any distinction in management fees that might be associated with
different investment objectives between funds, we included a dummy variable for each of the four
objectives, excluding Aggressive Growth funds which serves as the benchmark.  The motivation
for including the fund objective is that the performance measure which we use (alpha) may not
fully capture the risks associated with alternative investment styles.  Furthermore, different
objectives may be associated with different levels of research and trading expenses.
The final variable used in the analysis was the turnover of the fund. Although brokerage
fees are not included in the fees charged, funds that turn over their portfolios more often are likely
to require higher research expenditures in comparison to 'closet index' funds. Our expectation is
that funds that have higher turnover ratios, ceteris parabis, will have higher fees.-13-
4.0  Description of the Data
The data used in this study were obtained from Morningstar's Mutual Fund OnDisc, May
1996.   The complete sample of U.S. equity funds consisted of 1065 firms.  We eliminated index
funds which are not actively managed and other funds with MER's  less than .30 since most of
those funds are managed for organizations or are otherwise restricted to specific types of
investors.   This resulted in a final sample for use in estimation of our models of 1015 funds.      
Tables 1a-1c describe some of the salient characteristics of these funds. The division into
load and no-load funds is relatively equal as is the split between funds with positive and negative
alphas.  The load funds are generally larger than the no-load  funds and those funds that
performed well are generally larger than those that performed poorly, though the size variance is
significantly greater for funds with negative alphas.  The better performing funds have both lower
MER's on average, as well as lower variance, and lower 12b-1 fees, and variance, than the poor
performing funds.  While this relationship holds across fund objectives for the MER's, it does not
hold uniformly across objectives for 12b-1 fees. 
5.0  Empirical Results
We conjectured at the outset that older funds might be more efficient, but throughout our
investigation, we found the age variable was an insignificant explanator of MER's, as did Ferris
and Chance in one of their samples, so we omitted the variable from further analysis.  Also, the
Small Company dummy variable coefficient was consistently insignificant and it was dropped from
the analysis as well.-14-
Although we present our results based upon both net returns (alpha) and gross returns (q),
there is little difference in the conclusions that one draws from the analysis using either measure of
quality.  Since the results based upon net returns are somewhat better, we shall focus on them
throughout our discussion. 
Initially, we examined the composition of the expense ratio for the entire sample of 1015
funds.  Table 2a presents the results for the linear model using net risk-adjusted returns as the
proxy for quality while Table 2b uses gross risk-adjusted returns as the quality proxy.  As
expected, fees are negatively related to the logarithm of size rather than to size.  The logarithm of
size performs consistently better throughout the analysis so we will report only the results based
upon the transformed size variable.  Although the variables are generally significant and consistent
in the two tables, the level of explanation is quite weak across all models. Of particular interest in
these results is that whether quality is measured by net or gross returns, quality is negatively
related to fees. The linear models presented in Tables 2a and 2b, although weak in their
explanatory power, do serve well as a comparative benchmark to show the impact of introducing
non-linearities and differences in quality on fees charged.       
Our theory suggests a difference in the fees/quality relationship for funds that performed
well in the past versus those that performed poorly. In particular, our theoretical model predicts a
positive relationship for the better performing funds and a negative relationship for the poor
performers. To test this, we divided the sample into those funds which had negative performance
measures over the last 36 months and those which had positive performance measures over the
same period.  The under-performing sub-sample consisted of  518 funds while the over-
performing sub-sample consisted of 497 funds.     {[(.281) ×497+(.645) ×518]/1015}  = .501 
9 2 2 ½
-15-
Table 3a presents the results for the poor performing funds using alpha as the quality
proxy.  A comparison of Model 5 which used a quadratic specification for fund performance with
the linear performance assumption in Model 6 and the logarithmic performance assumption in
Model 7 suggests that, as expected, the quadratic performance assumption best fits the data due
to the short time horizon facing these managers.  The lower is the quality of the manager, the
greater the sensitivity of fees to quality.  For the funds that performed well in the past, a
comparison of Models 5, 6 and 7 in Table 3b shows that while the expense ratio is logarithmically
related to the level of performance, the relationship is quite flat.  The linear and quadratic
specifications are practically indistinguishable from the logarithmic form.  The results suggest, as
equation (6) predicts, for high quality managers, an increase in quality results in higher fees.  
As predicted, the results in Tables 3a and 3b show large differences between positive and
negative alphas.  A comparison of the standard error of the linear alpha model (equation 5) using
the overall sample of funds in Table 2a, which is .634, with the average standard error of the
equivalent regressions in Tables 3a and 3b, which is .501, shows a significant improvement in
9
explanatory power from differentiating the sample into positive and negative alpha funds. What is
clear is that the results in Table 2a are dominated by the poor performing funds within the sample. 
The probable cause of this is the large variance of the MER's for the funds with negative alphas
relative to the variance for the funds with positive alphas as can be seen in Tables 6b and 6c.
When the funds are combined in a single sample and only differentiated by past
performance, the results in Table 5a confirm our theoretical predictions of a negative relationship
between MER and quality for funds that performed poorly and a positive relationship for those  The combined model was also estimated with size differentiated by positive and negative alpha funds,
10
but the differences in size coefficients were not significant so we do not present them here.  
  Because the MGTCO variable was constructed only on the basis of the number of equity funds within
11
the complex and excludes fixed income funds, the scope effect may be underestimated.  
-16-
that performed well in the past.
10
Tables 3a and 3b are also consistent with the negative relationship between MER's and
size of funds that was predicted in our model.  Moreover, for the funds with negative alphas, the
impact of size on MER's is significantly greater than it is for the sample of funds with positive
alphas which was also predicted by our theoretical model.   
The results for Model 5 in each of Tables 3a, 3b and 5a suggest that funds with more
conservative objectives have lower fees relative to the Aggressive Growth funds. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that more aggressive management styles are associated with greater
research expenditures.  The finding is also consistent with the hypothesis that beta is an
incomplete measure of risk across funds so that the riskier Aggressive Growth funds have
performance measures which are higher than their actual performance.
The effects of size and the number of funds within the management group are also as we
expect. Even for poor performing funds, the results suggest the presence of economies of scope. 
In order to examine the number of funds for which there exists economies of scope, we created
individual dummy  variables denoting one fund within the complex, two or fewer funds, etc. The
results of these alternative specifications showed that economies of scope existed with two or
more equity funds and did not increase as the number of funds exceeded two in the complex. 
11
Our earlier hypothesis was that funds that turned their portfolios over more often spent
more on research so that we would expect a positive relationship between turnover and MER's. Front end and deferred load values as well as dummy variables for load were examined with none of the 
12
load related variables being significant when 12b-1 fees were also included in the model.
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This expectation is confirmed across our models. The coefficient on turnover is positive and
generally significant.
It has been suggested by Ferris & Chance that 12b-1 fees are a substitute for load fees. 
We examined this proposition within the context of our model.  Tables 6a-6c describe the load
and 12b-1 characteristics of our sample.  These tables show that there were no funds in the
sample that had both front and rear loads.  Of the load funds, almost 78% are front-end loaded.  
While only 21.2% of the no-load funds have 12b-1 plans, 75% of the front load funds and 99.1%
of the deferred load funds have 12b-1 plans.  The high percentage of  load funds that also have
12b-1 plans suggest that 12b-1 fees complement load charges and are not a substitute for load
charges as Ferris & Chance have suggested. 
Another interesting feature of the data is the size of the 12b-1 fee.  Funds with deferred
loads have mean 12b-1 fees approximately three times the mean 12b-1 fee for those funds with
front end loads or no-loads.  This together with the near unanimity among deferred load funds
choosing 12b-1 plans suggests that for these funds, 12b-1 fees are substitutes for front-end load
charges.
Table 6a shows that 80% of the load funds within our sample also have 12b-1 plans which
suggests that these broker incentives are not substitutes.  The size of the 12b-1 fee, moreover, is
at least as high for load funds as it is for no-load funds.  The complementary relationship between
load and 12b-1 fees suggests that the addition of a load variable  may have little explanatory
12
value which is exactly what our empirical results found. We therefore dropped load as an-18-
explanator.  It appears that 12b-1 charges are part of the marketing package of load funds to
induce advisors to direct investors to themselves.   
The results of regressing 12b-1 fees on MER's are highly significant and robust across
models and quality differences among fund managers. In each model, the coefficient on the 12b-1
fee is close to 1.0 indicating that funds charge close to the maximum allowed 12b-1 fee.
6.0  Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has developed a model for explaining the determinants of management fees
within mutual funds. The predictions of the model are tested using a sample of U.S. equity funds. 
A number of interesting results are derived, some of which disagree with currently accepted
wisdom.
We find that larger funds have smaller MER's with the MER decreasing at a decreasing
rate with size.  We also find that better managers charge higher fees, appropriating some of the
benefits associated with improved performance.  At the same time, for low quality managers, as
their performance deteriorates, they increase their fees since the benefit from an increase in fees
outweighs the present value of any lost fees in the future associated with a decrease in market
share of the fund.
The paper has also shown that more conservative funds have lower fees than their more
aggressive counterparts possibly due to greater research expenditures paid by the latter group.  At
the same time, high turnover rates appear to be symptomatic of  operating inefficiencies.  Those
funds with 12b-1 plans, moreover, appear to charge close to the maximum fee allowed.    
While economies of scope have been shown to be quite strong, the cost reducing benefits-19-
associated with additional funds appears to decline rapidly.  Yet, we see approximately 870 of
1015 equity funds within our sample associated with management companies containing 2 or
more equity funds.  One reason for this is that the greater the number of funds within the
complex, the easier it is for the management company to bury the historical record of its losers. 
This greater ability to hide the history of the poor performing funds as the number of funds within
the management complex grows is not captured within  our model and is certainly worthy of
future study.         References
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Define F as the difference between the fund’s market share at T and the critical size below
which the fund siezes to exist, i.e.
It follows that
For low quality funds, dF/dT < 0, implying dT/dM > 0.  Since we are comparing two funds of 0
different sizes at the same point in time,  N  is constant so that the sign of dT/dM is the same as 0 0
the sign of dT/dN0.
When comparing two funds differing in their performance levels,
Again, since dF/dT < 0, dT/dq > 0. Glossary of Variables
ALPHA    Measure of the difference between a fund's actual return over the most recent 36-
month period and its expected performance given its level of risk as measured by
beta.  ALPHA =  (Return on Fund - Return on T-Bills) - Beta x (Return on
S&P500 - Return on T-Bills)
Q Quality of the fund manager, estimated as ALPHA + expense ratio.  
LSIZE   Logarithm of the net asset value of the fund.
12b-1   The maximum annual charge deducted from fund assets to pay for distribution and
marketing costs.
EQINC   Funds that seek current income by investing at least 50% of their assets in equity
securities with above average yields.
GRINC   Funds that seek growth of capital and current income as near equal objectives by
investing in equity securities with above average yields and some potential for
appreciation.
GRTH   Funds that seek capital appreciation by investing primarily in equity securities of
companies with earnings that expected to grow at an above average rate.
TURNOVER  A measure of the fund's trading activity which is computed by taking the lesser of
purchases or sales  (excluding all securities with maturities less than one year) and
dividing by average monthly assets.








NEGALPHASQ   ALPHASQ for all ALPHA < 0
POSLALPHA   LALPHA for all ALPHA > 0
NEGQSQ QSQ for all ALPHA < 0
POSLQ LQ for all ALPHA > 0Table 1a
Overall Sample
(1015 funds)
                                                           Size (million $)                    MER                              12b-1
Objective Mean Var. Mean Var Mean Var
    Aggressive Growth 1,127.82 6,619,656 1.607 .553 .345 .143
    Equity Income 931.27 5,212,447 1.220 .180 .225 .092
    Growth 777.86 9,111,467 1.333 .567 .226 .094
    Growth & Income 1,047.08 9,006,999 1.272 1.042 .226 .090
    Small Company 365.72 371,263 1.402 .387 .204 .087
Load 923.97 10,986,672 1.442 .353 .380 .110
No-Load 670.64 3,248,340 1.233 .880 .076 .035




                                                         Size (million $)                       MER                              12b-1
Objective Mean Var. Mean Var Mean Var
    Aggressive Growth 161.38 28,741 2.164 1.439 .296 .134
    Equity Income 533.16 1,133,895 1.235 .195 .214 .097
    Growth 660.42 13,713,220 1.415 .876 .235 .097
    Growth & Income 891.92 9,121,658 1.365 1.383 .252 .100
    Small Company 151.09 44,049 1.540 1.239 .213 .105
Load 869.32 16,440,371 1.457 .465 .376 .113
No-Load 465.44 2,091945 1.344 1.649 .082 .040
Overall 679.86 9,749,976 1.404 1.024 .239 .100Table 1c
Positive Alpha Funds
(497 funds)
                                                         Size (million $)                       MER                              12b-1
Objective Mean Var. Mean Var Mean Var
    Aggressive Growth 1,391.40 8,093,978 1.455 .203 .358 .145
    Equity Income 2,219 16,236,119 1.173 .129 .261 .074
    Growth 915.16 3,696,977 1.238 .188 .216 .091
    Growth & Income 1,413.43 8,545,222 1.053 .167 .163 .060
    Small Company 411.20 428,776 1.373 .201 .203 .084
Load 987.93 4,597,098 1.425 .221 .383 .106
No-Load 860.97 4,245,596 1.129 .144 .071 .031
Overall 921.00 4,415,817 1.269 .202 .219 .091Table 2a
Composition of the Expense Ratio
using Net Risk-Adjusted Returns
(Sample of 1015 funds)
Dependent Variable: Expense Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
C 2.029    1.801        2.049        1.904       1.961      1.594 
(30.634)  (28.395)  (28.765)  (25.168)  (25.822) (24.703)
ALPHA -.034     -.034     -.051         -.051      -.052        -.063     
(-6.883) (-7.606) (-10.368)  (-10.30)  (-10.60)   (-12.97)
SIZE -.000
  (-1.971)
LSIZE -.133    -.129         -.117      -.117        -.100     
(-10.667) (-11.182) (-10.343) (-10.382)   (-8.443)
12B-1    .903           .898          .881         .942       .983   
 (13.377)  (13.640)  (13.505)  (14.282) (14.457)
EQINC     -.508       -.460        -.420     -.463    
  (-5.525)   (-5.034)   (-4.619) (-4.933) 
GRINC     -.440        -.390       -.407     -.474    
  (-6.753)   (-5.977)   (-6.297) (-7.134)
GRTH     -.338        -.323       -.336     -.385    
  (-6.028)   (-5.796)   (-6.076) (-6.780)
TURNOVER    .0016       .0017      .0018   
  (5.167)  (5.684) (3.589)
LMGTCO    -.087     -.133    
  (-4.469) (-7.103)
R 0.172 0.296 0.334 0.351 0.364 0.322
2
SE of Reg. 0.721 0.665 0.648 0.641 0.634 0.655
T-statistics in parentheses.Table 2b
Composition of the Expense Ratio
using Gross Risk-Adjusted Returns
(Sample of 1015 funds)
Dependent Variable: Expense Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
C 2.112    1.881        2.072        1.918       1.978      1.545   
(31.758)  (29.420)  (27.383)  (23.954)  (24.537) (21.753)
Q -.009    -.013          -.026       -.026       -.027        -.039    
(-1.724)   (-2.805)   (-4.865)   (-4.853)  (-5.169)   (-7.317)
SIZE   -.000     
 (-2.293)  
LSIZE -.150    -.144         -.137      -.137        -.120     
(-11.92)   (-12.35)   (-11.82)   (-11.89)   (-9.904)
12B-1    .912           .920          .901         .962       1.023      
 (13.150)  (13.400)  (13.251)  (13.962) (14.263) 
EQINC     -.364       -.316        -.280     -.323    
  (-3.784)   (-3.297)   (-2.939) (-3.254)
GRINC     -.304        -.253       -.274     -.347    
 (-4.445)   (-3.696)   (-4.019) (-4.903)
GRTH     -.229        -.214       -.229     -.283    
  (-3.887)   (-3.650)   (-3.932) (-4.672)
TURNOVER    .0017       .0018      .0019    
  (5.359)  (5.841) (5.836)
LMGTCO    -.085     -.143    
  (-4.281) (-7.234)
R 0.136 0.262 0.279 0.299 0.316 0.248
2
SE of Reg. 0.737 0.681 0.674 0.666 0.660 0.690
T-statistics in parentheses.Table 3a
Composition of the Expense Ratio
using Net Risk-Adjusted Returns
(Funds with   < 0)
Dependent Variable: Expense Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
C 1.852    1.628        1.829        1.793       1.842      1.496   2.145 
(24.161)  (22.774)  (17.706)  (16.413)  (17.026) (11.322) (12.686)
ALPHASQ -.009     -.010     -.010         -.009      -.009    
(-25.155) (-28.318) (-28.450) (-27.634) (-28.026)
ALPHA -.207    
(-20.305)
LALPHA -.156    
(-4.409)
LSIZE -.127    -.124         -.120      -.122        -.104      -.096     -.179    
(-8.497)   (-9.240)   (-8.971)   (-8.997)   (-7.509) (-5.725) (-8.212)
12B-1    .872           .872          .867         .947       .909    .863   
 (11.308)  (11.361)  (11.249)  (12.096) (9.799) (7.033)
EQINC     -.271       -.250        -.197     -.273     -.183    
  (-2.418)   (-2.186)   (-1.739) (-2.036)  (-1.030) 
GRINC     -.245        -.224       -.222     -.231     -.137    
  (-2.615)   (-2.332)   (-2.354) (-2.064) (-.922)
GRTH     -.225        -.213       -.207     -.264     -.190    
  (-2.493)   (-2.341)   (-2.302) (-2.475) (-1.344)
TURNOVER    .0004       .0006      .0002   .0021   
  (1.024)  (1.736) (.386) (3.589)
LMGTCO    -.098     -.085     -.102    
  (-4.145) (-3.022) (-2.737)
R 0.628 0.702 0.706 0.707 0.716 0.601 0.303
2
SE of Reg. 0.619 0.554 0.552 0.553 0.544 0.645 0.853
T-statistics in parentheses.Table 3b
Composition of the Expense Ratio
using Gross Risk-Adjusted Returns
(Funds with   > 0)
Dependent Variable: Expense Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
C 1.622    1.384        1.431        1.363       1.409      1.390    1.436   
(26.742)  (31.409)  (30.477)  (27.809)  (29.068) (29.978) (29.652)
ALPHASQ .001   
(3.197)
ALPHA .016   
(4.416)
LALPHA .075    .075            .061         .052         .049      
(5.386)   (7.706)   (5.639)   (4.775)  (4.693)
LSIZE -.075    -.070         -.068      -.066        -.053      -.054     -.053    
(-8.071)   (-9.467)   (-9.156)   (-8.966)   (-6.994) (-7.107) (-6.864)
12B-1    .985           .973          .962         .997       .982      .982    
 (22.398)  (22.242)  (22.261)  (23.424) (23.003)  (22.774)
EQINC     -.097       -.107        -.048     -.060     -.105    
  (-1.267)   (-1.426)   (-.652) (-.810) (-1.429)
GRINC     -.152        -.143       -.158     -.165     -.200    
  (-3.485)   (-3.326)   (-3.771) (-3.944) (-4.924)
GRTH     -.055        -.060       -.072     -.072     -.097    
  (-1.766)   (-1.951)   (-2.415) (-2.396) (-3.297)
TURNOVER    .0008       .0009      .0009     .0009    
  (4.123)  (4.511) (4.281) (4.670)
LMGTCO    -.062     -.059     -.059    
  (-5.319) (-4.972) (-4.938)
R 0.136 0.572 0.582 0.595 0.617 0.616 0.608
2
SE of Reg. 0.419 0.296 0.293 0.288 0.281 0.281 0.284
T-statistics in parentheses.Table 4a
Composition of the Expense Ratio
using Net Risk-Adjusted Returns
(Funds with   < 0)
Dependent Variable: Expense Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
C 1.945    1.705        1.884        1.853       1.901      2.011   2.200 
(22.322)  (20.537)  (15.616)  (14.538)  (14.990) (12.943) (13.173)
QSQ -.018     -.018     -.018         -.018       -.018    
(-19.190) (-21.436) (-21.437) (-20.633) (-20.804)
Q -.164    
(-10.935)
LQ -.162    
(-5.233)
LSIZE -.143    -.139         -.137      -.138        -.121      -.152 -.180    
(-8.437)   (-8.958)   (-8.756)   (-8.758)   (-7.432)   (-7.613) (-8.400)
12B-1    .911           .910          .905         .983       1.050   .900   
 (10.155)  (10.154)  (10.049)  (10.702) (9.262) (7.394)
EQINC     -.247       -.228        -.176     -.256     -.139    
  (-1.890)   (-1.712)   (-1.327) (-1.572)  (-.787) 
GRINC     -.200        -.181       -.180     -.213     -.084    
  (-1.829)   (-1.616)   (-1.621) (-1.564) (-.574)
GRTH     -.205        -.195       -.188     -.257     -.145    
  (-1.945)   (-1.828)   (-1.785) (-1.986) (-1.037)
TURNOVER    .0003       .0006      .0011   .0023   
  (782)  (1.377) (2.113) (4.000)
LMGTCO    -.097     -.106     -.113    
  (-3.482) (-3.128) (-3.059)
R 0.516 0.597 0.601 0.601 0.610 0.415 0.314
2
SE of Reg. 0.706 0.645 0.644 0.645 0.638 0.782 0.846
T-statistics in parentheses.Table 4b
Composition of the Expense Ratio
using Gross Risk-Adjusted Returns
(Funds with   > 0)
Dependent Variable: Expense Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
C 1.337    1.188        1.222        1.187       1.238      1.339    1.425   
(20.573)  (25.290)  (22.803)  (21.923)  (23.050) (26.620) (29.553)
QSQ .001   
(4.237)
Q .021   
(6.196)
LQ .232    .181            .167         .151         .144      
(10.117)  (10.929)   (8.900)   (7.870)  (7.680)
LSIZE -.070    -.067         -.066      -.065        -.053      -.055     -.053    
(-7.048)   (-9.424)   (-9.288)   (-9.145)   (-7.208) (-7.330) (-7.013)
12B-1    .919           .917          .913         .948       .958      .973    
 (21.777)  (21.708)  (21.785)  (22.886) (22.709)  (22.679)
EQINC     -.025       -.038        .014       -.032     -.093    
  (-.336)   (-.512) (.192) (-.440) (-1.270)
GRINC     -.086        -.083       -.100     -.138     -.188    
  (-2.010)   (-1.962)   (-2.424) (-3.353) (-4.648)
GRTH     -.015        -.021       -.035     -.053     -.087    
  (-501)   (-.707)   (-1.190) (-1.772) (-2.973)
TURNOVER    .0007       .0007      .0008     .0008    
  (3.341)  (3.736) (3.874) (4.437)
LMGTCO    -.058     -.055     -.057    
  (-5.136) (-4.762) (-4.789)
R 0.242 0.614 0.617 0.624 0.643 0.630 0.615
2
SE of Reg. 0.393 0.281 0.280 0.278 0.271 0.276 0.282
T-statistics in parentheses.Table 5a
Composition of the Expense Ratio
using Net Risk-Adjusted Returns
Dependent Variable: Expense Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
C 1.741    1.506           1.608          1.563         1.616      
(35.097) (34.653) (31.038) (28.747) (29.831)
NEGALPHASQ -.010    -.010              -.010           -.010           -.010         
(-31.249) (-36.084) (-36.426) (-35.711) (-36.352)
POSLALPHA       .082              .085                .058              .054              .051        
(4.892) (6.019) (3.742) (3.430) (3.301)
LSIZE -.100    -.096              -.094           -.094            -.079         
(-10.950) (-12.398) (-12.228) (-12.226) (-9.861)
12B-1    .922            .919            .911          .967       
(20.187) (20.228) (20.053) (21.191)
EQINC     -.169            -.158             -.120        
(-2.691) (-2.510) (-1.925)
GRINC     -.167            -.154           -.168        
(-3.761) (-3.437) (-3.815)
GRTH     -.108            -.106           -.117        
(-2.795) (-2.760) (-3.074)
TURNOVER    .0006         .0007      
(2.663) (3.360)
LMGTCO    -.079        
(-5.999)
R 0.548 0.678 0.683 0.685 0.696
2
SE of Reg. 0.533 0.450 0.447 0.446 0.439
T-statistics in parentheses.Table 5b
Composition of the Expense Ratio
using Gross Risk-Adjusted Returns
Dependent Variable: Expense Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
C 1.756    1.522           1.597          1.556         1.609      
(32.119) (30.876) (25.887) (24.147) (24.965)
NEGQSQ -.019    -.019              -.019           -.019           -.019        (-
(-24.542) (-28.670) (-28.665) (-27.856) 28.207)
POSLQ       .128              .115                .090              .086              .082        
(5.919) (6.116) (4.021) (3.817) (3.697)
LSIZE -.113    -.108              -.106           -.106            -.091         
(-11.280) (-12.303) (-12.049) (-12.039) (-9.902)
12B-1    .929            .930            .923          .978       
(18.050) (18.079) (17.912) (18.809)
EQINC     -.118            -.107             -.071        
(-1.597) (-1.444) (-.963)
GRINC     -.104            -.090           -.106        
(-1.943) (-1.683) (-1.987)
GRTH     -.076            -.074           -.084        
(-1.680) (-1.629) (-1.887)
TURNOVER    .0005         .0007      
(2.243) (2.828)
LMGTCO    -.077        
(-5.157)
R 0.461 0.593 0.595 0.596 0.607
2
SE of Reg. 0.582 0.506 0.506 0.507 0.499
T-statistics in parentheses.Load Structure and 12b-1 Plans
Table 6a
 Deferred  Load     Front Load          No Load
Objective 12b-1 No 12b-1 12b-1 No 12b-1 12b-1 No 12b-1
Aggressive Growth 11 0 17 6 6 16
Equity Income 9 0 26 7 3 27
Growth 53 1 137 55 41 175
Growth & Income 24 0 72 20 31 95
Small Company 16 0 45 11 26 85
113 1 297 99 107 398
Table 6b
                                               
Deferred  Load   Front Load        No Load
Objective 12b-1 No 12b-1 12b-1 No 12b-1 12b-1 No 12b-1
Aggressive Growth 100.0% 0.0% 73.9% 26.1% 27.3% 72.7%
Equity Income 100.0 0.0 78.8 21.2 10.0 90.0
Growth 98.1 1.9 71.3 28.7 19.0 81.0
Growth & Income 100.0 0.0 78.3 21.7 24.6 75.4
Small Company 100.0 0.0 80.4 19.6 23.4 76.6
99.1 0.9 75.0 25.0 21.2 78.8
Table 6c
                                                                                           
 Deferred  Load     Front Load          No Load
Objective 12b-1 No 12b-1 12b-1 No 12b-1 12b-1 No 12b-1
Aggressive Growth 9.7% 0.0% 5.7% 6.1% 5.6% 4.0%
Equity Income 8.0 0.0 8.8 7.1 2.8 6.8
Growth 46.9 100.0 46.1 55.5 38.3 44.0
Growth & Income 21.2 0.0 24.2 20.2 29.0 23.9
Small Company 14.1 0.0 15.2 11.1 24.3 21.3
Mean 12b-1 Fee 0.925 0.300 0.360